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This paper analyzes how mobility of post-graduate skilled workers and students across 
different countries affects the quality level of higher education and the way education is 
financed. We start by examining a closed economy. In the presence of imperfect credit 
markets the education level with pure fee-financing is lower than the optimal level. If the 
credit market imperfections are not too large, a mix of tax- and fee-financing is optimal. The 
reason for this is that with pure fee-financing too few individuals decide to study. With 
mobility of skilled workers, both countries have an incentive to attract foreign skilled mobile 
workers as tax-payers while - at least partially - free-riding on the other country’s provision of 
education. Both countries thus increase the tuition fee above the optimum and change the 
level of education correspondingly. If countries maintain the financing mix foreign skilled 
workers are attracted by suboptimal levels of educational quality. Allowing also for mobile 
students may intensify the upward race of fees. The case of free-riding on the education 
provided by other countries may be strengthened. However, countries may anticipate this race 
and abstain from engaging in fee competition in the first place. 
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helpful comments. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Individual mobility becomes more and more a driving force that inﬂuences national policies. It is
especially crucial as higher education and research are concerned as it enlarges the opportunities
of students and aﬀects their returns to education. In addition, the mobility of students and
skilled workers induces changes in governmental educational policies and introduces competition
between educational institutions or countries.
We are here particularly interested in the impact of the ﬁnancing mix (public or private) of
higher education and of the realised quality level on the individual incentives to attain higher
education and in how those decisions inﬂuence in turn governmental educational policies. More-
over, the ﬁnancing and the provision of higher education may be aﬀected by labor mobility. The
aim is thus to analyze which quality levels of education can be sustained in countries open to
migration and which ﬁnancing (mix) is optimal.
The analysis is conducted in a general equilibrium setup. We analyze a two-period overlap-
ping generations model with two jurisdictions and individuals who diﬀer in their innate abilities.
In the ﬁrst period, individuals decide whether (and where) to study and in the second period
educated workers decide where to work. Since students do not earn an income in the ﬁrst period
their costs incurred by higher education can either be subsidized by wage taxes or they can ob-
tain a credit to pay the costs in the form of fees. In a ﬁrst part, we look at the closed economy
case to derive results which can serve as benchmarks for the open economy setting. In a second
part, we analyze open economies where migration is restricted to post-graduate skilled workers.
We also discuss the case when migration of skilled workers and of students is possible.
The ﬁrst part on closed economies looks in detail at diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments - namely
ﬁnancing via tuition fees and via wage taxes as well as mixed ﬁnancing. The education levels
are derived for each system and compared to the optimal allocation of a social planner for both
countries. In the case of perfectly competitive credit markets we ﬁnd that for the same education
level more individuals choose to become educated when education is tax-ﬁnanced than when it
is fee-ﬁnanced. Tax-ﬁnancing thus induces individuals also with lower ability levels to opt for
acquiring education. Furthermore, we show that the chosen education level in the tax-ﬁnancing
country is higher than in the fee-ﬁnancing country with the latter corresponding to the social
planner’s optimum. This no longer holds in the presence of imperfections on the credit markets.
The education level with pure fee-ﬁnancing is lower than the optimal level. If the credit market
imperfections are not too large, we show that a mix-ﬁnancing system is optimal. The reason
for this is that with pure fee-ﬁnancing too few individuals decide to study and to supply labor
as skilled workers. The welfare can thus be increased by partially subsidizing education via
taxes. If the credit market imperfections are, however, important, pure tax-ﬁnancing leads to a
second-best level of education.
The second part addresses the mobility issue in an integrated labor market of both countries.
In accordance with evidence we assume that only post-graduate skilled workers are mobile in
the second period (see, e.g., Demange, Fenge and Uebelmesser, 2008). Thus individuals who
decide not to study in the ﬁrst period and to work as unskilled workers stay in their home
country. We choose the optimal mixed-ﬁnancing system and the optimal educational level as
the starting point in both countries. We are interested in whether mobility of skilled workers
generates distortions on these optimal levels.
2For the scenario where only skilled workers are mobile, the optimal allocation is distorted
in two ways. For a given education level, a country can increase the tuition fees which implies
that it can lower the wage tax to ﬁnance higher education. At the same time, fewer individuals
decide to attain higher education since subsidization of their study is reduced. This eases the
country’s budget constraint because the tax-ﬁnanced spending per student diminishes and fewer
individuals take up higher education. However, there are two countervailing eﬀects. The ratio
of the wage of skilled workers to the wage of unskilled workers increases and the wage tax rate
decreases so that the higher net wage of skilled workers incites more individuals to study. We
show that those general equilibrium eﬀects do not oﬀset the ﬁrst eﬀect. We ﬁnd that both
countries have an incentive to attract foreign skilled mobile workers as tax-payers while - at
least partially - free-riding on the other country’s provision of education. Both countries thus
increase the fee above the optimal level.
Taken the tuition fee level as given, a country can also decide to decrease the educational
level in order to attract foreign skilled workers. Lowering the educational level reduces directly
the cost of higher education and, thereby, the tax revenue needed to ﬁnance higher education.
Under the assumption that the number of individuals who decide to study decreases with lower
educational levels (which depends on the production technology and the cost function of higher
education; see section 3.3) the indirect eﬀect of fewer students reduces further the educational
costs and increases the wage rate of skilled workers in relation to the wage rate of unskilled
workers. Hence, the overall impact of lowering the educational level increases the net wage of
skilled workers which attracts foreign workers and increases welfare. In a migration equilibrium
the educational qualities in both countries will be set at levels below the optimal one.
Finally we discuss the scenario where not only skilled workers in the second period but
also students in the ﬁrst period are mobile. In a Nash-equilibrium, the countries may intensify
the race to the top as fees are concerned as they try to attract skilled workers and to deter
students in order to save educational costs. The free-riding of countries may escalate although
in equilibrium the number of students does not change. Depending on the optimal ﬁnancing mix
to start with, however, it is also possible that countries abstain from increasing fees in the ﬁrst
place as they anticipate this race to the top. Then, the optimal ﬁnancing mix is maintained.
Our paper is related to the literature of higher education subsidies. One of the earlier
contributions is Johnson (1984) who analyzes the distributional eﬀects of subsidies. He argues
that even though these subsidies beneﬁt only those who study, there is not necessarily a conﬂict
of interest due to complementarities between skilled and unskilled labour. Creedy and Francois
(1990) more directly address majority voting of higher education subsidies when education
generates a positive externality leading to growth. Both Johnson and Creedy/Francois abstract,
however, from credit market imperfections and uncertainties related to the education investment.
The riskiness of this investment is at the core of the analysis by García-Penalosa and Wälde
(2000) who compare the eﬃciency and equity eﬀects of a tax-subsidy scheme to loan schemes
and graduate taxes. All these papers have in common that they focus on a closed economy. As
we have already pointed out, however, mobility is an important consequence of labor market
integration and even more so as high-skilled workers are concerned.
The analysis has therefore been extended to an open economy framework in more recent
contributions. Wildasin (2000) analyzes the eﬀects of labor market integration on human capital
investment in a general equilibrium model with uncertainty where education may be either
3publicly or privately ﬁnanced. (Industry-speciﬁc) skills expose individuals to wage risks while
mobility across jurisdictions can help to eliminate these risks. The focus is thus on the decision to
acquire education in an open economy setting with uncertainty where two ﬁnancial regimes are
compared and workers are mobile. In Del Rey (2001), on the contrary, students are mobile. The
analysis concentrates on the ensuing ﬁscal competition and how this aﬀects the governmental
decision about the public provision of higher education.
A further aspect is central in Kemnitz (2005). He analyzes the impact of tuition fees on
the quality of higher education under decentralized and centralized decision making. Special
attention is given to the question as to what extent fees crowd out public funds under both
regimes. Busch (2007) and Mechtenberg and Strausz (2008) also look at the quality level of
education in an open economy. While in Busch the positive correlation between education quality
and the mobility of graduates induces governments to lower the quality level to counteract the
threat of a brain drain, Mechtenberg and Strausz come to similar conclusions in a setting with
mobile students where governments fear free-riding.1
Our paper is clearly related to Wildasin (2000) in the sense that we also look at an integrated
labor market with mobility of skilled workers in a general equilibrium framework. We abstract,
however, from uncertainty and focus instead on the choice of ﬁnancing of higher education and
the educational quality while allowing for heterogeneous individuals with respect to their innate
ability.
We proceed as follows: In the next section, we present the model. In section 3, we analyze
the closed economy where migration is not possible. In section 4 we analyze the impact of
migration of skilled workers on the ﬁnancing mix of higher education and the educational level.
Furthermore, we discuss the modiﬁcation of results when students are mobile, too. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
To analyze the interaction of higher education and migration between the labor markets, each
country is described by the same overlapping generations model. Individuals live for two periods
and the population growth rate is nil. There is one consumption good, which cannot be stored.
The good is produced from two kinds of labor, skilled and unskilled and there is no capital. The
labor supply is determined by the individuals decisions to acquire higher education as follows.
Individuals diﬀer with respect to their innate ability. In the ﬁrst period of their life, they decide
whether (and where if they are mobile) to receive higher education. Those who choose to do so
will supply skilled labor at the second period of their life and others will supply unskilled labor
at both periods their life. Hence the structure of labor supply at a given period is determined
by the current and past individuals decisions to acquire higher education.These decisions aﬀect
the structure of labor supply in the following period. We shall concentrate on steady state
situations.
In each period higher education has to be ﬁnanced via wage taxes by workers in the same
1The incentives for a government or an old generation to invest in internationally applicable education are
analyzed in Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) and Poutvaara (2004). These questions will, however, not be included
in the analysis here.
4period and via tuition fees by the students. To analyze these choices, we consider the following
set-up. At the ﬁrst stage, governments choose the quality level of education and how higher
education is ﬁnanced, i.e. via taxes and/or via fees. At the second stage, individuals make their
education and migration decisions given the governmental arrangements for higher education.
We describe in more details a closed economy in which all individuals at each period of their
life are immobile. This simpliﬁes the presentation since wages, taxes and education parameters
are those of the home country. The modiﬁcations under the mobility of skilled workers or of
students will be introduced when needed in subsequent sections.
2.1 The production sector
The production sector in each country uses two kinds of input:2 labor supplied by individuals
with and without higher education, Ls (skilled labor) and Lu (unskilled labor) respectively,
where it is assumed that only skilled labor is mobile in open economy.3 Production takes place
according to a neoclassical production function with constant returns to scale so that:





= Lu f (l) (1)
where l = Ls
Lu
denotes the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor. We assume competitive labor
markets in each country. The optimal demand for labor implies that productivities of skilled
and unskilled workers are equal to their respective wage rates ws and wu:
ws = fl (2)














Throughout the paper, to avoid corner solutions, we shall assume Inada conditions, according
to which marginal productivities with respect to a factor increase indeﬁnitely as the factor
becomes scarce and that marginal cost to education increases indeﬁnitely with the level:
Assumption 1: limLu→0 FLu(Lu,L s)=∞ and limLs→0 FLs(Lu,L s)=∞;
lime→∞ c0(e)=∞.
2.2 The demand for higher education
Individuals are distinguished by an ability parameter, y,w h i c hr e ﬂects individually diﬀerent
beneﬁts from higher education. The distribution of abilities is identical in each country and
2We abstain here from explicitly considering capital in the production technology. Taking the eﬀect of edu-
cation on capital into account would be interesting, but it is outside the scope of the present paper.
3This corresponds to empirical evidence according to which mobility increases with education. See, e.g.,
Ehrenberg and Smith (1993).
5assumed for simplicity to be uniform in the range [0,y]. Only some individuals of a generation
with high enough abilities decide to study. The rest starts working as unskilled workers.
To be skilled, an individual must receive higher education. Education quality or level is
denoted by e. The quantity of skilled labor provided by an educated worker with education
level e depends on her ability y:i ti sg i v e nb yye. For simplicity, we assume that the amount of
money spent for higher education per individual only depends on the education level, given by
c(e). Put diﬀerently, costs in education are proportional to the number of students, given the
quality.4 The cost function c is assumed to be increasing and convex.
If an individual decides to study, she pays a fraction 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 of her education costs as fees
during the ﬁrst period, fc(e), and earns no wage income. In the second period, the educated
worker receives a gross wage income which depends on her ability y: wsye. The wage income
net of tax is wsye(1 − τ) where τ is the tax rate levied to ﬁnance the remaining costs of higher




− f · c(e). (5)
If the individual decides not to study she receives a wage income net of tax of (1 − τ)wu in both





The individual compares the lifetime incomes and chooses the option that maximizes her income.
The decision whether to study or not depends on the ability of the individual. The marginal
ability type who is indiﬀerent between both options is given by
yFT =
wu (2 + r)
wse
+
(1 + r)fc (e)
(1 − τ)wse
(7)
Of course, the pure fee-ﬁnanced and the pure tax-ﬁnanced systems are obtained as particular
cases. With obvious notation, taking respectively (τ =0 ; f =1 )and (f =0 ; 1> τ > 0),w e
have
yF =




wu (2 + r)
wse
(9)
2.3 Imperfections on the credit market
We interpret a positive interest rate as the result of imperfections on the credit markets. In
an overlapping generation model without a storable good, borrowing takes place between the
individuals of one generation (not all decide to study) and possibly between generations. All
the involved interest payments accrue from the borrowers to the lenders. Financial institutions,
4Education is thus considered here as a private good.
6if any, are pure intermediaries. As shown by Gale (1973), feasible states are characterized by
the condition that interest payments are zero. There are two possible steady states: either the
equilibrium interest rate is equal to the population growth rate (the golden rule equilibrium) or
there is no borrowing between diﬀerent generations (the autarky or no-trade equilibrium). We
rule out autarky. Thus, without frictions, the interest rate is the golden rule interest rate, which
is here is nil because population is constant. When the credit market is not perfectly competitive,
the net interest payments are positive and accrue to ﬁnancial intermediaries. When on aggregate
a young generation borrows, net interest payments are positive if the interest rate is positive.
This is the more plausible situation because young individuals who decide to study have no
income in the ﬁrst period and need to borrow in order to ﬁnance their studies and to consume.
It is unlikely that the unskilled young workers will save enough to compensate these needs.
In that case, the positive interest rate characterizes a deadweight loss on the imperfect credit
markets. Another interpretation of the positive interest rate is that there are moral hazard
problems (see von Weizsäcker and Wigger, 2001). The positive interest rate can be interpreted
as a risk premium charged by credit markets due to the risky investment in human capital. In
the following we will show how this imperfection aﬀects the ﬁnancing of higher education.
3 Financing higher education without migration
As a benchmark, this section disregards migration eﬀects and analyzes the individual and gov-
ernmental decisions within a closed country. Higher education may be ﬁnanced partly by fees
paid by students and partly subsidized by taxes levied on labor income. We start by considering
the second stage of the game. Hence, we analyze the individual choice of studying and the
resulting equilibrium on the labor market.
Then we turn to the ﬁrst stage of the game. First we derive the optimal policy when abilities
can be observed by a social planner and both the education level and the number and the abilities
of students can be chosen. We then study the decision problem faced by a government which
chooses the education level without observing abilities.
3.1 Equilibrium employment
We are interested in the impact of the education level on individual decisions and the resulting
impact on the labor markets. We describe here how an education level e and the ﬁnancing
parameters, f, τ,a n dr, determine a (steady state) equilibrium of the labor markets.
Basically we look at an equilibrium under rational expectations as follows. The individuals’
decision to be skilled or unskilled just derived are based on ’expected’ wages. These decisions,
more precisely the ability threshold level, determine the supply of skilled and unskilled labor,
which in turn determine the wages that clear the markets. At an equilibrium, these realized
wages must be equal to the initial expected wages.
Let us describe more precisely the labor market. As already mentioned, the population
growth rate is assumed to be nil. In each period, employment consists of young and old unskilled
workers and old skilled workers. Let an education level e and a threshold ability level of skilled
workers y be given. The number of unskilled workers per generation, denoted by Nu,i se q u a l
7to y and the number of skilled workers, denoted by Ns,i se q u a lt oy − y. The employment of
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which is equal to the number of skilled workers multiplied by their average ability and the
educational level.
The above expressions determine the labor forces and hence the wages of skilled and unskilled
labor thanks to (2) and (3) as a function of the threshold y and the educational level e.W e
denote these wages by ws(y,e) and wu(y,e).
These wages in turn determine the incentives to be skilled, i.e. they determine yFT as given
by (7). At an equilibrium of the labor markets, the obtained value yFT must be equal to the





(1 + r)fc (e)
(1 − τ)ews(y,e)
=0 (12)
Equilibrium is unique (see Section 6.1). The intuition is that as there are fewer skilled
individuals, the incentives to become skilled are enhanced through the impact on wages, which
gives an equilibrating force. In other words, increasing the threshold ability means that fewer
workers become skilled which raises the wage rate for skilled and decreases the wage rate for
unskilled.
3.2 The incentives to acquire education: comparative statics
How the educational level aﬀects the ability threshold turns out to be important for the sequel.
As we have just seen, the threshold is given by the implicit equation (12). It is convenient to
rewrite this equation by deﬁning the net beneﬁtf o ray-agent to acquire education,
B(y,e)=( 1− τ)[ye.ws(y,e) − wu(y,e)(2+r)] − (1 + r)fc (e) (13)
With this notation, equation (12) writes as B(y,e)=0 , which says that the net beneﬁto f
education is null for the marginal student. The beneﬁti n c r e a s e sw i t hy.5 Hence the monotony
property of yFT with respect to the educational level e depends on how the net beneﬁtt ot h e
5As we have just seen, increasing the threshold ability y means that fewer workers attain a skilled level which
raises the wage rate for skilled and decreases the wage rate for unskilled.
8marginal student varies with e. More precisely
∂yFT
∂e = −Be
By(yFT,e):i ft h en e tb e n e ﬁti n c r e a s e s ,
yFT decreases, raising the number of students, and similarly if the net beneﬁtd e c r e a s e s ,yFT
increases.
The educational level has two impacts on the net beneﬁt: a direct one because the total
wage of a skilled worker is proportional to e and the cost varies with e, and an indirect one
through the equilibrium wages. The indirect impact always lowers the net beneﬁt: increasing
the education level is akin to increasing skilled labor, hence wu increases and ws decreases. The
direct impact is ambiguous and depends in particular on how steep the marginal cost is. The













− (1 + r)fc0 (e) (14)
The skilled wage decreases with a higher education level since the eﬀective labor supply of
skilled increases6 with e. Thus the ability threshold increases with the educational level (fewer
individuals decide to study) if the net wage income of the skilled decreases or if it increases to
a smaller extent than the share of marginal educational costs increases which has to be paid by
fees. It is convenient to reformulate Be in terms of the elasticities of wages with respect to the
educational level, and the elasticity of substitution.






















Note that ηws,e < 0, ηwu,e > 0, and 0 < σ < ∞, and they are related by










because Ls = e
(y2−yFT2)
2 and Lu =2 y gives ∂ ln(Lu/Ls)
∂ lne = −1. This means the larger the
substitutability between the two labor inputs is (the larger σ is) the smaller is the decrease in
the wage ratio due to a higher educational level.
Using this notation, we have
Be =( 1− τ)[ywS(1 + ηws,e) − (2 + r)
wuηwu,e
e
] − (1 + r)fc0(e) (15)
At the threshold level, equation (12) is satisﬁed. Plugging the value of wu given by this equation
and using the elasticity σ yields
Be(yFT,e)=( 1− τ)[yFTwS(1 −
1
σ





























9Observe that it must hold that
(1−τ)yFTwSe
(1+r)fc(e) > 1. By short-writing R ≡
(1−τ)yFTwSe
(1+r)fc(e) ,t h e
following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 Let R =
(1−τ)yFTwSe












and similarly replacing large inequalities by strict ones.
The conditions in the cases of pure tax or fee-ﬁnancing can be easily derived by setting
f =0or f =1 , τ =0 . By taking the limit in the ﬁrst case, the condition in lemma 1 reduces to
1 ≥ 1/σ so that ﬁnancing education only by taxes implies that the ability threshold decreases
(increases) with the educational level if and only if σ is larger (smaller) than unity.
Lemma 1 gives a characterization of the impact of education on the threshold. Basically the
condition says that increasing educational level incites more individuals to acquire education
if the wages do not react too much compared to a measure composed with the cost elasticity
and skilled wage elasticity. A contrario a higher educational level leads to a lower number of









This inequality holds under two alternatives: either (a) the return to education is small
enough relative to the sum of the cost elasticity and skilled wage elasticity (i.e., R−
c0(e)e
c(e) +ηws,e <
0) or (b) wages react strongly to educational choices, so that 1/σ is large enough. Observe that
this is surely the case for σ ≤ 1:s i n c e
c0(e)e
c(e) > 1 because we assume a convex educational cost
function and ηws,e < 0, the left hand side of (18) is smaller than 1.
As an illustration, with a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas production function F (Ls,L u)=
Lα
sL1−α
u , α ∈ (0,1), the substitution elasticity is unity and
∂yFT
∂e > 0. If education is purely
tax-ﬁnanced (f =0 )w eﬁnd that
∂yT
∂e =0in this case.
In case of a CES production function F (Ls,L u)=A[θ(LS)−ρ +( 1− θ)(LU)−ρ]−1/ρ with
A>0, θ ∈ (0,1) and −1 < ρ 6=0 ,w eh a v e1/σ = ρ +1 . T h i ss h o w st h a tb o t hc a s e so fa n
increasing or decreasing impact of education level on the number of students are possible.
3.3 Government decisions
Now we analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game. We ﬁrst derive the optimal allocation in the absence
of any informational constraints. Then, we compare it to the optimal decisions of governments
for cases where higher education is ﬁnanced either via fees or via taxes or where there is mixed-
ﬁnancing and individuals freely choose to study.
103.3.1 Optimal allocation
Under complete information on individuals’ abilities, a social planner can decide on the level of
education and on the ability of those who study. The criterion is aggregate production net of
education cost at a steady state, given by F(Ls,L u)−Nsc(e). This is the criterion that obtains
in a fully ﬂedged overlapping generations economy in which the planner treats all generations
equally. In other words, we are at the golden rule with an implicit interest rate equal to the
population growth rate, which is here equal to zero (see Gale, 1973).
The choice of the level of education and of the minimum ability of those who study, e and y
respectively, fully determines skilled and unskilled labor from (10) and (11). Hence deﬁning
W (y,e)=F(Ls,L u) − Nsc(e) (19)
where Ls,L u are functions of e and y and Ns is a function of y alone, the objective is to maximize
Max
e,y W (y,e).
The objective is concave, and thanks to Assumption 1, there must be both skilled and
unskilled workers at an optimum. Besides, the education level has to be bounded.7 Hence the



















It is equal to the eﬀect on the production of the skilled minus the increase in cost.
The impact of a marginal increase in the minimum ability level y, keeping the education












= −wsey +2 wu + c(e) (21)
It is equal to the net impact on the productivity of a student of ability just equal to y from
becoming skilled compared to remaining unskilled where the impact is measured at the steady
state situation.










−wsey +2 wu + c(e)=0 (23)
7If the cost is linear, one has to assume that education levels are bounded: from (20) with c0(e)=1 ,i ft h e
return to education is positive for y, then education should be as large as possible: the optimal level is at the
upper bound.
11that is, the marginal gain from a change in education on the average student, ws
y+y
2 is equal to
the marginal cost, and the net gain of education for the marginal student is null.
In the sequel, we put a superscript ∗ to indicate the values at the optimum solution for
wages, education levels, etc.. In the following analysis, two features may hamper this optimum
solution to be reached. First, individuals’ abilities are no longer assumed to be observable (or
contractible). Due to these informational asymmetries, the set of students cannot be chosen
as an omniscient social planner does. The government chooses the optimal level of education
taking account of the individual decisions which are determined by the threshold level of ability.
Second, the interest rate faced by the individuals is not at the golden rule level (equal to zero)
b u ti ti sp o s i t i v e .
3.3.2 Education level with pure fee-ﬁnancing
The welfare criterion of the government is still the aggregate production net of education cost
at a steady state. Given an education level, the equilibrium ability threshold which determines
who decides to study is denoted by yF(e). Thus, the government’s objective is
Max
e W(yF(e),e)=F(Ls,L u) − Nsc(e) (24)
in which skilled and unskilled labor levels are those determined by the equilibrium threshold
ability level:

















de denotes the equilibrium change in the threshold ability level - and thus in the selection
of abilities - that results from an increase in the education level. The impact on welfare due
to a marginal change of education is thus composed of two terms: an indirect one through the
selection of abilities and a direct one.
For r =0 , the optimal ability associated with a given education level coincides with that
chosen by individuals, that is ∂W
∂y (yF(e),e) is identically null as can be seen from (8) and (21).
An immediate consequence is that the optimal level of education coincides with the optimum
level as given by (23).
Consider now the more plausible situation in which, due to distortions on the credit market,
r is positive.














At the optimal level e∗, this expression is positive because a positive interest rate reduces the
incentives to study, that is, increases yF(e) and the skilled wage: the average ability of students
is larger than at the optimum, enhancing the beneﬁts to improve education level.
12As for the indirect impact of changing education level we have with (8) and (21):
∂W
∂y
(yF(e),e)=−r(wu + c(e)) (28)
This reﬂects the interest on the eﬀective cost of education to an individual, i.e. the fee plus the
forgone wage in the ﬁrst period. Since this is negative, welfare would be improved by lowering
the ability threshold, this means by educating some unskilled individuals.
The government however can choose only the education level. Consider the optimum level
of education e∗ and the chosen level yF(e∗). On the one hand, welfare is increased by increasing
e and on the other hand by decreasing y below yF(e∗).T h u s i f yF decreases with e,t h e r ei s
ad o u b l eb e n e ﬁt in increasing the educational level above the optimal one. Otherwise, if yF
increases with e, there is a trade oﬀ between improving quality of education but decreasing even
further the number of students.
Now, we can use the results obtained in section 3.2 where the behavior of yF is analyzed.
(Since the equilibrium on the labor markets changes with the threshold ability level, the behavior
of yF cannot be directly seen from equation (8) due to the impact on wages.) We can therefore
state
Proposition 2 Consider an economy with purely fee-ﬁnanced education.
With a perfect credit market, r =0 , the optimal level of education leads to the optimal alloca-
tion.
With an imperfect credit market, r>0, the level of education is higher than the optimum if
more individuals will study with a higher e, that is if the condition in lemma 1 holds (elasticity
of substitution σ is suﬃciently large and average cost of education does not increase too much).
3.3.3 Education level with pure tax-ﬁnancing
We consider the same setting except that now the government levies a tax on all workers in a
given period to ﬁnance education. We assume that there is no distortionary impact of taxes
on the labor-leisure choice nor any redistributive considerations outside the educational system.
The decision problem for the optimal level of education is then given by
Max
e W(yT(e),e)=F(Ls,L u) − Nsc(e) (29)
subject to the budget constraint
τ (wsLs +2 wuNu)=Nsc(e)
in which skilled and unskilled labor levels are those determined by the threshold ability level
yT(e), as in (25) replacing yF(e) by yT(e). Since the level yT(e) is independent of τ,t h e
government can choose the education level and then set the tax rate so as to ﬁnance the costs,
provided this gives a value for τ smaller than 1.
























and the indirect impact, with (9) and (21) is
∂W
∂y
(yT(e),e)=−wseyT(e)+2 wu + c(e)
= −rwu + c(e) (32)
Let us start with the direct impact (cf. (31)). We discuss here the case of a ﬁnancial market in
which the interest rate r is not too large, more precisely where −rwu + c(e∗) ≥ 0 at the wage
resulting from the threshold yT(e∗).8 In that case, the absence of fees for becoming skilled gives
to some individuals with low ability too much incentive to study, that is yT(e∗) is smaller than
y∗.A s a r e s u l t , ws is smaller than w∗
s. Since at the optimal level e∗, the right hand side of
equation (31) is zero when yT(e∗) is replaced by the optimal level y∗ and ws by w∗
s, the direct
marginal impact of education on welfare is negative at e∗: in the absence of an indirect impact
through the selection of students, the education level in the tax country must be lower than
the optimum. Under the assumption that r is not too large (see (32)), the indirect impact is
positive: increasing the ability threshold above that chosen by individuals is welfare improving.
Again, the absence of costs for becoming skilled gives to some individuals too much incentive to
study, contrary to the fee setting.
To sum up, if yT decreases with e, there is a double beneﬁt in decreasing the educational
level below the optimum level: on the one hand, welfare is increased by decreasing e a n do nt h e
other hand by increasing y above yT(e∗). From section 3.2, this occurs when the elasticity of
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor σ is larger than 1 in e. For a Cobb Douglas
function for instance (σ is equal to 1), the threshold level is constant and only the direct eﬀect
of education aﬀects welfare: the chosen level is lower than the optimum. We can therefore state
Proposition 3 Consider a country with tax-ﬁnancing.
With a perfect credit market, r =0 , the level of education may be higher, equal to or lower than
the optimum. It is smaller than the optimum (or that in a country with fee-ﬁnancing) if the
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor σ is larger than 1.
With an imperfect credit market, r>0, assuming the elasticity of substitution σ to be larger than





3.3.4 Education level and ﬁnancing if both taxes and fees are available
Now we assume that the costs of higher education are partly ﬁnanced by tuition fees paid by
the students and the remainder by taxes levied on wage income. The budget of the government
8yT(e) solves y − wu(y,e)(2+r)
ws(y,e)e =0 .(see (9)). The left-hand side is an increasing function of y (see the
section proof), hence yT(e∗) ≤ y∗ iﬀ the left-hand side is larger than 0 for y = y∗ and e = e∗ which is equivalent
to −rw∗
u + c(e∗) ≥ 0.
14is given by:
τ (wsLs +2 wuNu)=( 1− f)c(e)Ns,f ∈ [0,1] (33)
The government maximizes aggregate production net of education costs by choosing simultane-
ously the education level e and the share of costs ﬁnanced by fees, f:
Max
e,f
W(yFT(e),e)=F(Ls,L u) − Nsc(e) (34)
where the tax rate is endogenously determined by the budget constraint (33). Since F(Ls,L u)=
wsLs+2wuNu, welfare is also equal to [1−τ/(1−f)]F(Ls,L u)) and we may restrict our analysis
to τ < (1 − f). The threshold ability for studying is now given by (7).
Since the planner can use two instruments, f and τ, and there are two parameters of interest,
the education level e and the ability of students as determined by the threshold, there is some
hope that the optimum can be achieved. To check whether this is possible, let us consider the
optimum levels e∗ and y∗ = yFT(e∗). T ob ei m p l e m e n t e d ,o n em u s tﬁnd f and τ for which
individuals have incentives such that the threshold equilibrium value yFT is given by y∗ and the
budget constraint (33) is satisﬁed.
Given e∗ and y∗ the budget constraint determines the ratio ρ = τ/(1 − f) (which is smaller
than 1). Now consider the expression of yFT as given by (7) where the right hand side is




u + c(e∗)],w eh a v e






1 − ρ(1 − f)
]
The optimum is implemented for f such that yFT = y∗, or equivalently for f for which the
term in square brackets is null. As expected, for r =0 , the optimum is reached with pure
fee-ﬁnancing, i.e. f =1 .L e t u s a s s u m e r>0. The term in square brackets increases with
f (since ρ is smaller than 1), and is positive at f =1 . Thus the optimum can be reached if
rw∗
u − c(e∗) < 0, i.e. if the distortion on the credit market is not too high.
If this is not the case, presumably, a pure tax system is the second-best solution with an
education level chosen as in the previous section. We can therefore state
Proposition 4 Consider an economy where taxes and tuition fees are available to ﬁnance higher
education.
With a perfect credit market, r =0 ,p u r ef e e - ﬁnancing is optimal and the education level is at
the optimal level.
With an imperfect credit market, r>0, it is optimal to have some share of educational costs
ﬁnanced by taxes. If r<
c(e∗)
w∗
u , the optimum can be reached.
The reason for the optimality of mixed-ﬁnancing with credit constraints is that with pure fee-
ﬁnancing too few individuals decide to study. The welfare can thus be increased by subsidizing
higher education via taxes as this encourages more students to study.
Having shown under which conditions the government of a country opts for a system which
is closer to fee-ﬁnancing or tax-ﬁnancing, we are able to give a rationale for the simultaneous
15existence of diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing higher education as long as borders are closed. This will
serve as a starting point for the following analysis where we allow for mobility of skilled workers.
The question will then be how the policy of one country changes taking the policy (ﬁnancing
system and education level) of the other country into account.
4 Opening up economies
We consider two identical countries A and B.9 There are y individuals in each country. The
number of students depends on the decisions of the diﬀerent ability types to take up a university
education in one of the two countries. Thus there are NA
s +NB
s =2 y−yA−yB students in both
countries. At given education levels, the labor force of skilled workers in the whole economy
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In both countries the credit market is imperfect and we make the plausible assumption that
the distortion is not too high so that c(e)
wu >r>0. Higher education can be ﬁnanced via a mix
of tuition fees and wage taxes. From the previous analysis we know that as long as the countries
are closed a mix-ﬁnancing is chosen that achieves the optimal levels of ability thresholds and
education. Since countries are identical we have: yA = yB = y∗ and eA = eB = e∗.I n t h e
next step the countries open up and migration takes place. The question is how the ﬁnancing
of education, the education level and the number of students and skilled workers change if the
governments take mobility into account.
4.1 Only skilled workers are mobile
We assume that skilled workers are mobile while students and unskilled workers are immobile.
Mobile skilled workers will migrate between both countries as long as the net-of-tax wage income
is diﬀerent. Thus the migration equilibrium requires that skilled workers receive the same net










because not all skilled individuals move to the same country (since we have assumed an Inada
condition on the production function).
Let us denote by a superscript the variables in country x = A,B. yx then denotes the
threshold level above which young agents study in country x. This threshold determines the
unskilled labor, Lx
u,i nc o u n t r yx since unskilled do not move, the number of students, Nx
s ,a n d
the skilled labor force of the native students, Lx
s, which are respectively given by :
Lx
u =2 yx,Nx








,x = A,B (36)
9A generalization to n countries is straightforward but would complicate unnecessarily the notation.
16The skilled labor force in a country comprises the native graduates and skilled migrants, which
can be positive or negative. The migrating skilled labor force is by convention counted from
country B to country A, and is denoted by m. Thus the skilled labor force in country A amounts
to LA
s + m while the skilled labor force in country B is given by LB
s − m.
4.1.1 Changing the tuition fee
Let us consider the mixed system that implements the optimum. By symmetry, the arbitrage
condition (35) for the skilled workers is satisﬁed. Starting from this situation, we want to show
how the welfare in one country, say country A, changes, when this country modiﬁes its fee-
ﬁnancing, fA in order to determine whether the optimum is a Nash equilibrium, and if not, in




s c(e∗), which is evaluated at the new migration equilibrium induced by
t h en e wv a l u ef o rt h ef e e :k e e p i n gt h ee d u c a t i o nl e v e lﬁxed, the equilibrium is determined by
values for the thresholds, the taxes and the migration level that satisfy equations (7) and budget
balances (33) in the two countries as well as the arbitrage condition (35). In particular a change
in a country may induce a change in the tax rate of the other country. To avoid unreasonable
levels, we shall assume that there is a maximal tax level τmax, smaller than 1. Beyond that
level, a country changes its policy tools.
Am o d i ﬁcation of the fee has an impact on welfare through two channels: it modiﬁes the
incentives to acquire education within the country and it aﬀects the incentives to migrate.
Assume that these variables move smoothly. A marginal change in welfare can be decomposed
into the change induced by a marginal change in yA, dyA, as if the economy was closed and a





















At the optimum, the term in bracket is zero: the impact of a policy change within a country
is null at the margin. Hence welfare is raised if dm > 0, i.e. if migration from B to A increases,
and is decreased otherwise.
Proposition 5 If only skilled workers are mobile both countries have an incentive to increase
fee-ﬁnancing above the level necessary to achieve the optimum.
Proof. See the proof in Section 6.2.
Here is a sketch of the proof. We show that by increasing its fee, country A spends less
on education and decreases its tax, thereby attracting skilled workers from B:c o u n t r yA free
rides on country B. To understand why, consider ﬁr s tw h a th a p p e n si fA increases its fee in a
closed economy without migration. The result, as shown in the proof, is that A spends less on
education, decreases its tax and has fewer students. (Without equilibrium eﬀect this is obvious:
an increase in the fee eases the budget because the spending per student is diminished and fewer
individuals want to study. There are however two countervailing eﬀects: the ratio of the skilled
17wage to the unskilled one increases and the tax decreases, both of which incite more people to
study. These eﬀects however do not oﬀset the ﬁrst one.) Thus the net skilled wage increases in
A, and becomes larger than in B.
Now open the economy. Since the net skilled wage of country A is larger than that of B,
skilled workers start to migrate from B to A. Although the gap between the net skilled wages
may not be decreasing with all levels of m, eventually a level is reached that equalizes the net
skilled wage, or the maximum tax level is reached in B.
Remark. Starting from a net skilled wage larger in closed country A than in B and opening
the economies, net skilled wages might not be monotone in m. Accounting for equilibrium
eﬀects, the impact on the net skilled wages in both countries of an increase of skilled labor in A
due to migration is threefold: through the exogenous increase in skilled labor in A and decrease
in B, through the impact on the ability thresholds due the change in equilibrium wages, and
through the impact on wages and taxes. Consider A for instance. An exogenous increase in
skilled labor induces a decrease in the skilled wage and a decrease in the tax level because there
are more taxpayers without additional cost. It can be shown that this creates a disincentive
to acquire education: fewer people become educated, thereby allowing to decrease the tax even
further.10 Because of these two opposite eﬀects, the net skilled wage in A may decrease or
increase, and this may depend on m (of course it also depends on the elasticity of substitution).
The fact that net skilled wages are not monotone suggests that, given some level of the fees in
A and in B, there may be multiple equilibria associated with distinct tax rates and migration
levels in opened economies. Migration creates some spillover eﬀects due to the tax decrease.
Multiplicity does not occur under a ’stability’ condition. This condition bears on the impact
of migration of skilled labor on the net skilled wage in a country. To emphasize the various










u are the equilibrium levels associated with the threshold level when the
country experiences the extra amount m of skilled labor (which can be positive or negative).
Stability requires the net skilled wage to decrease with migration. Under this condition, starting
from a net skilled wage larger in closed country A than in B, skilled workers from B migrate
towards A and the gap between the skilled net wage in the two countries diminishes, and
equilibrium is unique.
4.1.2 Changing the educational level
We consider now how the educational level is inﬂuenced by the mobility of skilled workers. The




s c(eA) in which m is the migration of skilled labor. Starting from the
optimum, arguing as before, the impact of a marginal policy change within a country is null.
Hence the sign of a welfare change depends on the sign of migration: a country has incentives
to increase the quality level if this attracts skilled workers from the other country, that is if ∂m
∂eA
is positive (assuming diﬀerentiability), and to decrease the level if it is negative.
10Decreasing the number of skilled lowers the cost of education by fc(e)dN and the tax revenues by τdF.T h e
former eﬀect outweighs the latter so that a surplus is generated: the tax rate decreases.
18Let us concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium (in which case no migration takes place).
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The term in bracket is the impact of a policy change within a country on welfare. At the
optimum, it is null and the welfare change depends on the sign of ∂m
∂eA as we have seen.) At
a Nash equilibrium, the ﬁrst order condition gives that the educational choice is suboptimal:
it is too low if an increase would incite skilled workers to migrate to the other country (i.e., if
∂m
∂eA < 0) and too high in the other case.
Arguing as in the previous section, it suﬃces to consider what happens to the net wage rate of
the skilled when a closed economy modiﬁes its educational level. If decreasing the educational
level increases the net wage rate of the skilled, this attracts skilled workers from the other
country when economies are open. Whether this is true depends on complex eﬀects. We have
seen how the quality level of education aﬀects the ability threshold when the ﬁnancing policy
(f,τ)i sk e p tﬁxed. When the system is not a pure fee system, a change in quality calls for a
change in the ﬁnancing policy so as to balance the budget, which in turn will have an impact
on the ability threshold and the wages.
In most situations however, the net skilled wage is likely to decrease when e is increased.
Consider ﬁrst a fee-ﬁnancing system. The budget is automatically balanced so that there is no
impact on the tax rate. Lemma 1 gives how the level of education quality aﬀects the ability
threshold. When the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labor is large and
the marginal cost of education does not increase too much, then increasing e increases the
number of students: the skilled wage surely decreases. At the opposite, when the elasticity of
substitution is small enough (for example smaller than 1) then increasing e always decreases
the number of students whatever the cost function or the ﬁnancing policy. How the skilled
wage reacts then depends on whether this induces an overall decrease in skilled labor, that is
whether the increase in the ability threshold is steep enough, which in turn is aﬀected by the
cost elasticity.
Next consider the case when the system is not a pure fee-ﬁnanced system. Budget balance
then implies that the tax moves in the same direction as the total costs of education if we assume
that fees remain unchanged. In particular, the tax rate increases with e if the number of students
increases or does not decrease too much. As for the skilled wage, since we are assuming that
e is increasing, it can increase only if the number of those who decide to study decreases fast,
that is if the ability threshold is suﬃciently steep. Hence overall, the question of whether the
net skilled wage decreases with e is largely determined by the steepness of the ability threshold.
When this ability is decreasing with e, we are sure that the net skilled wage decreases with e.
When the system is a pure tax-ﬁnanced system, the threshold behavior only depends on wages,
more precisely it is completely determined by the size of σ relative to 1. We are therefore sure
that net skilled labor decreases when e increases if σ is larger than 1.
When we have a mixed system, a diﬃculty is that the tax rate interacts with the ability
threshold: an increase for example in the tax rate due to an increase in educational costs has a
countervailing eﬀect on the ability threshold since it tends to make studies less attractive. For
19the following proposition we make an assumption which is slightly stronger than the condition
in Lemma 1. It ensures that the overall impact of an increase in quality on the ability threshold
is still negative. Observe however that this is far from being necessary for the net skilled wage














Thus we can state
Proposition 6 Assume Assumption 2 holds. If only skilled workers are mobile both countries
will decrease the educational level below the optimum.
Proof. See the proof in Section 6.
Hence, under the assumption stated in the proposition, if the educational level is decreased
fewer individuals decide to study which increases the net wage rate of the skilled. This attracts
skilled workers from the other country who increase the net production. Due to symmetry, both
countries thus have an incentive to attract foreign skilled mobile workers as tax-payers while -
at least partially - free-riding on the other country’s provision of education.
4.2 Skilled workers and students are mobile
Individuals who decide to study and skilled workers can migrate between countries without costs
at both periods of their life. Furthermore, in line with EU rules, students have access to the
education system of a foreign country at the same conditions as natives. Graduates are assumed
to be (partially) mobile as well. We thus allow for some non-perfect link between student and
graduate mobility following, e.g., Parey and Waldinger (2007) who provide evidence that mobile
students are more likely to work abroad after graduation.
4.2.1 Welfare criterion
We ﬁrst need to make precise the criterion used by a country. We choose here a criterion
associated to the welfare of individuals who work in a country. In particular, a student who
goes abroad and does not come back is counted in the resident country. Without imperfection
on the credit markets, the sum of the lifetime income of all workers in A is
W = FA − NAAc(eA) − (1 − fA)NABc(eA) − fBNBAc(eB) (39)
where FA is the value of production in A and NIJ is the number of skilled individuals who
study in I and work in J. Using the government budget equation
(1 − fA)[NAA + NAB]c(eA)=τAFA
welfare can also be written as
W = FA − [τAFA + fANAAc(eA)+fBNBAc(eB)] (40)
20The objective is the value of production in the country less the cost of education supported di-
rectly or indirectly by the workers in A: NAAc(eA) does not deserve comment, (1−fA)NABc(eA)
represents the part supported by the workers of A (ﬁnanced through taxes) of the cost of edu-
cation for the native who will migrate to B,a n dfBNBAc(eB) is the cost paid by the workers
who have studied abroad through their fees (the remaining part being paid by the tax payers of
country B).
4.2.2 Individuals decision
In both countries, in the ﬁrst period of their life, young individuals not only have to decide
whether to study but also where to study and, after having acquired education, they have
to decide where to work. They compare their net life-time incomes for all possible education
and migration choices. The migration equilibrium for skilled workers still implies the arbitrage









so that skilled workers are indiﬀerent between the two countries.
Now, individuals who decide to study compare their net lifetime income if studying in country
A or in country B, that is they consider the diﬀerence
[(1 − τA)eAwA
s y − (1 + r)fA c
¡
eA¢
] − [(1 − τB)eBwB




A y-student for which this diﬀerence is positive (resp. negative) studies in A (resp. in B).
In addition, she decides to study by considering her net lifetime income as an unskilled worker.
Since unskilled workers remain immobile, this income depends on the home country, equal to
(1 − τA)wA
u (2 + r) or (1 − τB)wB
u (2 + r).
Expression (41) is linear in y, giving rise to three possibilities: either (a) individuals are all
indiﬀerent between studying in A or in B or (b) they split according to a threshold ability, or
(c) they all prefer to study in the same country.
Case (a) holds when the slopes and the intercepts are equal. By the arbitrage condition (35),
the net skilled wages are equalized, hence it holds if (and only if)
eA = eB,fA = fB. (42)
4.2.3 Changing the fees
Let us start again from the symmetric mixed-ﬁnanced system which is optimal for a closed
economy. We ﬁrst consider the incentives to change the fees. Let the educational quality level
be kept unchanged in both countries. Under imperfect credit markets, the system is mixed. Let
ac o u n t r y ,s a yA, contemplate increasing its fee. Only fees matter as by the arbitrage condition
the net skilled wages are equalized. It follows that we are in case (c): all individuals will study in
country B if they decide to study, and the cost of education in country A falls to zero, allowing
for a null tax rate: there is free riding. These changes are far from being marginal, so that we
11For the arbitrage condition to hold, it suﬃces to assume that part of the skilled workers are mobile.
21cannot argue as previously by looking at small deviations. Furthermore, B may be unable to
educate all these students without increasing its fee. We investigate these points.
Consider welfare. At the initial situation, welfare is equal to
F∗ − Nsc(e∗)=( 1− τ∗)F∗ − f∗Nsc(e∗). (43)
After the change in fees, since there are no students in A,a n dfB = f∗, welfare in country A is
given by
WA = FA − f∗NBAc(e∗) (44)
where FA is the production level associated to the new allocation of workers in the two economies.
All skilled workers in A study abroad, hence their number is NBA. Comparing with the initial
expression (43), it is as if the cost of education in A per student was reduced to f∗c(e∗) or
alternatively as if the tax could be set to zero and still satisfy budget balance.
As a result of the large inﬂow of students, country B w o u l dt h e nh a v et oc h a n g ed r a s t i c a l l y
its ﬁnancing policy. It would have to increase its tax rate, or to increase its fees if the maximum
admissible tax level is reached. We discuss both cases.
When the system is mostly ﬁnanced by taxes, it is likely it cannot absorb the additional
costs of education by a sole increase in taxes. Thus, country B would have to increase fees up
to the same level as in country A. This would lead back to the same ﬁnancing policy with the
same number of students in both countries. Higher education, however, would now be ﬁnanced
by a sub-optimal mixture of fees and taxes. Anticipating the reaction of country B,c o u n t r yA
abstains from increasing the level of fees in the ﬁrst place. A symmetric equilibrium then results
where the optimal ﬁn a n c em i xo ft h ec l o s e de c o n o m yc a nb es u s t a i n e d .
I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s ew h e r et h es y s t e mi sm o s t l yﬁnanced by fees, we cannot exclude that
country B is able to educate the inﬂow of students because the taxes are small anyway (To
understand better this point, consider the extreme case of a pure fee system. Where students
study has no impact at all on government budgets nor on welfare.) Country A is likely to beneﬁt
from its deviation: the production would possibly decrease a little bit but the cost of education
would drop. We shall argue however that it is unlikely that B does not react by increasing its
fee as well.
First observe that by the arbitrage condition and the fact that the tax rate in A is null, the
skilled wage in A is smaller than in B. Hence, by the homogeneity of the production funtion,
the ratio of skilled labor to unskilled labor and the unskilled wage are larger in A than in B.
















It follows that the net unskilled wage income in A is surely larger than in B : wA
u > (1−τB)wB
u .
As a result, natives in A have less incentive to study, and since unskilled do not move, we have
LA
u >L B
u . But then the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor can be larger in A than in B only if
there is a migration of skilled workers born in B that is suﬃciently massive. We think that it is
likely that B will react by increasing its fee as well.
224.2.4 Changing education
What happens when the education levels can diﬀer across the countries? From the previous
argument, a migration equilibrium with diﬀerent levels of fees and taxes in the two countries
can only realise if the quality level of education in the country, say A, which increases its fees
exceeds the one in country B.T h e n c o u n t r y A specialises in attracting high-ability students
while country B focuses on low-ability ones. Whether this constitutes an equilibrium when
general equilibrium eﬀects are taken into account, depends on the speciﬁc functional forms.
The relative importance of student and graduate mobility will be essential for the ﬁnancial
regime and the quality level of education.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Countries increase their output by employing highly productive skilled workers. And they may
beneﬁt from letting those workers graduate in other countries, thus saving on the educational
costs. In integrated labor markets where skilled workers are mobile the participating countries
can pursue such a policy. The problem of such a policy is that in equilibrium all countries
may end up in subsidizing higher education too little by relying too much on tuition fees and
providing a suboptimal educational quality. This is the central message of our paper.
Starting with the optimal higher education policy in a closed country without mobility we
show that the eﬃcient way of ﬁnancing higher education is to let students pay tuition fees
refraining from state subsidies ﬁnanced by taxes. If higher education is understood as a more or
less private good with negligible external eﬀects and if credit markets work perfectly competitive
pure fee-ﬁnancing is the optimal policy. However, we have reservations with respect to the second
assumption: are credit marktes for investments in human capital really competitive? There are
several reasons why not which we have discussed in detail in the paper. Hence, we analyze the
case of imperfect credit markets and ﬁnd that a mix of tuition fees and tax-ﬁnanced subsidies
can indeed restore the optimal allocation, i.e. a governmental policy can achieve the optimal
number of students and the optimal educational level even in the presence of imperfect credit
markets. This mix-ﬁnancing of higher education is indeed what we observe in all countries.
We take this optimal mix-ﬁnancing scheme in two identical countries with imperfect credit
markets as the outset for analyzing the impact of the mobility of skilled workers on the higher
education systems. Against this benchmark we show that if countries open up their borders
governments have an incentive to decrease education spending, either by decreasing quality or
by increasing fees, so as to increase net skilled wages and attract skilled labor. Hence, mobility
generates distortions of the optimal governmental policy. The reason is that countries free-ride
on the higher education provided by other countries and therefore reduce the subsidies and the
educational quality to ineﬃciently low levels.
This analysis focuses on the mobility of post-graduate skilled workers. Allowing also for
mobility of students may intensify the fee competition and enforce the incentives to increase
the fees. Now in addition to attracting skilled worker, the policy also deters students to study
within the country which helps to save educational costs. The case of free-riding on the education
provided by other countries may be strengthened. However, countries may anticipate this race
23which results in equilibrium in the same number of students in each country. Hence, countries
may abstain from engaging in fee competition in the ﬁrst place.
We have restricted our analysis to symmetric countries. If we drop this assumption and allow
for diﬀerent policies in both countries an asymmetric equilibrium could result with diﬀerentiated
quality levels. Countries may specialize their educational systems by either providing high edu-
cational quality at high costs and attracting high ability students or providing low educational
quality at low costs and being satisﬁed with educating low ability students. From an overall
welfare point of view, diﬀerentiation might be beneﬁcial as it relaxes the constraint of a single
quality level of education per country. This extension is left for future research.
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256P r o o f s
6.1 Threshold behaviour
We gather some useful properties on the behavior of the ability threshold at an equilibrium of
the labor market, given (f,τ,e).D e n o t eb y∆(y,e) the function deﬁned for y in ]0,y[.
∆(y,e)=
wu(y,e)(2+r)+( 1+r)f/(1 − τ)c(e)
ws(y,e)e
(45)
where wu(y,e) and ws(y,e) are the equilibrium wages if labor quantities are given by (10) and
(11). According to (12), an interior equilibrium solves y−∆(y,e)=0 .I ti su s e f u lt oo b s e r v et h a t
function ∆ decreases with y:A sy increases, there are less skilled workers, hence the unskilled
wage wu(y,e) decreases and the skilled one ws(y,e) increases.
We ﬁrst show in point (a) that there is a unique solution, and then derive some comparative
statics result about the threshold behavior yFT(e).
(a) There is a unique equilibrium
First note that ∆(.,e) changes sign when y runs over ]0,y[: thanks to the Inada conditions
on productivities we have limy→0 ∆(y,e) > 0 and limy→y ∆(y,e) < 0. Since the function
y → y −∆(y,e) increases in y, it follows that there is a unique solution yFT to y −∆(y,e)=0 .
Comparative statics results now are obtained by noticing that the unique solution to y −
∆(y,e)=0increases (resp. decreaes) with a parameter if the function ∆ is increasing (resp.
decreasing) ) with that parameter.
(b) yFT(e) increases with e if wu (y,e)
e · ws (y,e) is non decreasing in e.
It suﬃces to show that ∆ increases with e.T h et e r m
c(e)
e.ws(y,e) is surely increasing because
average cost increases and ws(y,e) decreases with e.T h eﬁrst term wu(y,e)(2+r)
ws(y,e)e is increasing
by assumption. Note that for a tax country, f =0 , the result can be strengthened as:
(c) yT(e) varies as the ratio wu (e)
ws (e) · e.
yT(e) increases if the ratio increases with e , that is under Assumption 2, and decreases (resp.
is constant) if the ratio decreases (resp. is constant) with e. With a Cobb Douglas function, the
ratio does not depend on e:t h i se x p l a i n sw h yyT is constant in that case.
(d) The threshold yFT(e) increases with f/(1 − τ) and with r.
It suﬃces to check that ∆(y,e) increases with f/(1 − τ) and with r.
6.2 Proof of proposition 5












26The arbitrage condition writes as Gap =0 .I ti ss a t i s ﬁed at the initial situation. The proof is
divided into two steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst consider a closed economy and show that an increase in the fee induces an
increase in the net skilled wage. Consider A for instance. Following a change in the fee df A,t h e
tax rate varies so as to balance the budget, accounting for the impact to acquire education, i.e.
the impact on the ability threshold. Denoting the variation in the government budget, the tax
rate, and the ability threshold respectively by dB, dτA,a n ddyA we have
dB = dτAFA +[ τ∗(2wA
u − wA
s eyA)+( 1− f∗)c(e)]dyA + df ANA
s c(e).
The tax varies so as to balance the budget, that is so as to satisfy dB =0 . The term multiplying
dyA is the net eﬀect on the budget of a marginal increase in the ability threshold: it is equal to
the change in the amount of taxes collected on the marginal skilled worker plus the saving on
educational cost. At the optimum, this net eﬀect is positive:12 using that [wA
s eyA−2wA
u −c(e)] =
0,w eh a v e[τ∗(2wA
u −wA
s eyA)+( 1−f∗)c(e)] = (1−f∗ −τ∗)c(e). Thus the budget variation is
dB = dτAF +( 1− f∗ − τ∗)c(e)dyA + df AN∗
sc(e). (46)
We show that an increase in the fee, df A > 0 induces dyA to be positive (less students) and
dτA be negative (lower tax rate). By contradiction, let us assume dyA to be negative. From
property (d) of proved in Section 6, the threshold decreases only if the ratio f/(1−τ) decreases.
Using the budget equation dB =0 , dyA < 0 implies dτAF +df AN∗
sc(e) > 0.S i n c eF>N ∗
sc(e)
and df A > 0 we therefore have dτA + df A > 0 : the possible decrease in the tax rate is smaller













is positive since 1 − τ∗ − f∗ > 0. This gives the contradiction: dyA is positive. Then dB =0
implies that the tax rate decreases.
Since there are less skilled workers and the tax rate diminishes, the net skilled wage in A
increases. In other words, taking m =0 , fA >f ∗ implies Gap > 0.
Step 2. Now open the economy. All skilled workers in B would like to migrate to A.S t a r t
to increase m. As long as the net skilled wage in A is larger than that in B, let the threshold
yB be determined by taking the net skilled wage to be that in A. In particular, at the opening
of the economies, there is a discontinuous increase in the number of students in B (i.e. a jump
downwards in yB). The tax rate is adjusted so as to satisfy the budget constraint in country
B: τBFB ≥ (1 − f∗)NB
s c(e)=( 1− f∗)c(e)(y − yB). Two restrictions have to be taken into
account: migration m must be smaller than the labor force that is educated in B, i.e., m ≤ LB
s
and the tax rate must be smaller than some level τmax < 1 (if this maximum is 1, the whole
production in B is used to cover the education costs).
Thus m is increased until either (a) the arbitrage condition is fulﬁlled or (b) τB reaches
τmax =1or (c) every skilled migrates to A,t h a ti sm is equal to LB
s . In case (a), we are done:
country A attracts some skilled workers for free. In case (b) the tax rate reaches its maximum:
12The argument below works as long as the net eﬀect is positive.
27country B stops educating all the students who want to become skilled so as to migrate to
country A.C o u n t r yA still attracts some skilled workers for free. Case (c) never occurs before
either (a) or (b) occurs: by contradiction, if it would, the skilled wage in country B becomes
arbitrarily large so that the net skilled wage in B is surely larger than in A (because τB is
strictly smaller than 1) so that (a) has been fulﬁlled before.
6.3 Proof of proposition 6













Note that the arbitrage condition, Gap =0 ,i ss a t i s ﬁed at the initial situation. We consider
that country A decreases its educational level in a closed economy and show that the net skilled
wage increases.
At the optimum, we have dF = d(c(e∗)N∗
s), whatever marginal variation in e or y.S i n c et h e
budget writes B = τF −(1−f∗)c(e)Ns), we obtain that dB = dτAF −(1−f∗ −τ∗)d(c(e∗)N∗
s)
and budget balance requires
dB = dτAF +( 1− f∗ − τ∗)[−c0 (e∗)N∗
sdeA + c(e∗)dyA]=0
Hence budget balance implies that the tax moves in the same direction as the total costs
of education. In particular, it increases with e if either the number of students increase (
∂yA
∂e
negative) or does not decrease too much. Since dyA is aﬀected both by the change in the tax
and the educational level, dB =0ﬁnally writes
dτA[F +( 1− f∗ − τ∗)c(e∗)
∂yA
∂τ

















































F +( 1− f∗ − τ∗)c(e)
∂yA
∂τ









(1 − f∗ − τ∗)c0 (eA)NA
s
(48)
28Using the budget equation F =
1−f





∂e − (1 + r)
f
1−τ c0 (e) − (2 + r) ∂wU
∂e
wSe + ye∂wS









∂y − (2 + r) ∂wU
∂y













Given this inequality holds which is stronger than our assumption in lemma 1 and implies
also the partial negative relationship between the threshold and the educational level, the total
relationship between the threshold and the educational level including the indirect eﬀect via the
tax is also negative. Thus, since there are less skilled workers and the tax rate diminishes, the
net skilled wage in A increases. Taking m =0 , G>0 if eA <e ∗.N o wo p e nt h ee c o n o m y .T h e
same argument as the one used for the previous proposition applies.
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